

1 Upstream Attractiveness of the Brazilian oil and Natural Gas
2 Sector: An Assessment based on the Stakeholders' Perceptions

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6

7 **Abstract**

8 This study provides an overview of 25 Upstream attributes of the Brazilian oil and natural gas
9 sector and of the country itself, identifying from the industry stakeholders' perspective the
10 strengths and weaknesses that were aggregated with the support of SPSS (Statistical Package
11 for the Social Sciences) in four factorials: Trade, Regulatory, Prospective and Business
12 Environment. The four field surveys which totalled 1,143 structured face-to-face interviews
13 were conducted during the 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 editions of Rio Oil Gas, the largest
14 trade fair of the industry in Latin America.

15

16 **Index terms**— oil and natural gas industry in brazil; stakeholder evaluation; attractiveness; regulation;
17 competitiveness

18 **1 Introduction**

19 The exacerbation of the competitive scenario for investments in the exploration and production of oil and natural
20 gas has increased in the last five years, despite the instability of the price of the barrel. Between 2016 and
21 2018, one hundred auctions were held in 82 countries, totalling 3,000 blocks and allowing national and provincial
22 governments to raise about US\$ 9 billion in Signature Bonus ?? In this competition, attractiveness matters. The
23 more attractive a country is to investment, the more leeway it would have to expand, in theory, its share in the
24 business, either via government take 3 (ODDONE, 2018). The entry of dozens of countries in the global struggle
25 for the attraction of resources of the sector results, above all, from technological advances that have widened
26 exploratory frontiers. Companies contend for the most lucrative opportunities; nations strive to know which one
27 will be the host of these investments.

28 2

29 There are different profiles in this dispute: traditional producers with vast reserves and different characteristics
30 -some with political stability and legal certainty 4 (government participation, such as royalties, and special
31 participation), an indicator regularly used by the oil industry to compare tax regimes or through benefits (such
32 as a more aggressive local content policy). That is, the greater the perceived attractiveness, the more likely it
33 is to capture higher incomes, certain that a high value will inhibit investments, while a level below the "optimal
34 value" will mean revenue losses for the country holding the oil resources.

35 3 13 The Signature Bonus is a traditional selection criterion in bidding for concession agreements. The value
36 of the bonus is associated with the companies' expectations regarding the productive potential of the disputed
37 blocks and the degree of competition for the area in the bidding round (IBP, 2018). 24 The IHS-CERA Report
38 to the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) evaluated 29 tax systems related to oil and natural gas from 20
39 countries. Brazil occupies an intermediate position in the ranking, 19th among the 41 systems investigated. The
40 modeled terms for the study are following the regulatory framework of concession before the approval of Law
41 12.351/2010. The sharing model had not been released at the time the report was written, "[...]" however, the
42 minimum 30% of state participation was modeled under the concession system to determine the likely increase in
43 government participation." By applying such a measure in the existing concession system, there is a 12% increase

3 II. METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED IN FIELD

44 in government take, from 59% to 71% in the case of high-yield oil fields (AGALLIU, 2011). 35 They are evaluated
45 from the perspective of risk analysis companies, such as the Economist Intelligence Unit, Eurasia, The Global
46 Economy, Moody's, Standard and Poor's and Fitch.

47 2 5

48 , such as the U.S.A. and Canada; others whose potential offsets the relative instability 4 On the other hand,
49 the technological revolution that allowed the development of shale gas and tight oil 6 , such as Russia, Egypt,
50 and Mozambique. Also, those holding huge reserves however marked by political instability, such as Venezuela,
51 Libya, Iraq, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Venezuela, for instance, has reserves of 303 billion barrels (BP, 2018) -1 st
52 in the global ranking -but its attractiveness from the companies' perspective, depends on the reestablishment of
53 political stability.

54 The competitiveness of countries with medium reserves and with some instability, such as Yemen, Ecuador,
55 Bolivia, and Gabon, depends on stimulating trade conditions, as the institutional deficit charges a price from
56 those that cannot compensate it with geological potentiality. In turn, low potential nations, with small reserves -
57 certain provinces in the U.S.A. and Canada, France, Papua New Guinea, and England seek to compensate for their
58 disadvantages by offering benefits. 5 In this conjuncture of rising international competition, uncertainty about
59 the price level of the barrel and doubts about the longevity of the use of fossil resources as the leading supplier
60 of primary energy, Brazil offers unique conditions for attracting investments due to its geological potential,
61 especially offshore, where the Pre-salt layer stands out significantly 7 in the U.S.A., Argentina, and China took
62 a step forward with cost reduction, calling into doubt the expensive oil era and adding a new competitor to the
63 traditional competition for investment. In this context, it is important to stress that barrel at moderate prices
64 means oil companies with less capital, which makes them more selective and increases global competition for
65 these resources. Also, the world is experiencing a transition to a carbon-free economy and the pressure to reduce
66 fossil fuel consumption increases every day, according to the objectives of the Paris Agreement. The electric car
67 is progressing, and several countries announce that they intend to cease the sale of gasoline and diesel vehicles.
68 Clean energy sources, such as solar and wind, gain ground quickly with increasingly competitive costs, prompting
69 oil companies to diversify their business to renewable projects. That is, oil is likely to lose ground and become
70 obsolete in the long term (ANP, 2018). 6 46 For Spiller and Holburn (2000), an unstable government would
71 offer little or no credibility assurance against direct or indirect expropriation of private property, which would
72 discourage private investment. ??7 Unconventional natural gas and oil, imprisoned in rocks of low permeability
73 called shale, require a special technique for its production known as hydraulic fracturing. For more information,
74 see FGV Energia. However, this attribute alone in this scenario may not be enough to support a model of
75 exploration of natural resources that can broadly internalize the benefits of this wealth.

76 Thus, from the host country perspective, which aims not only to attract investments 7 The perception of
77 Brazilian Upstream attractiveness 9 but to take over a larger share of the oil income, it is pressing to properly
78 manage the attractiveness requirements and an agenda of efforts to improve it. If improvements in attractiveness
79 can increase the possibilities of gains for the country, it seems strategic to systematically measure the variables
80 that influence the investment decision, allowing governments to identify and quantify strengths and weaknesses
81 of the country and monitor the performance of public policies. ??10 depends on the interviewee's position.
82 Employees of oil companies usually have a different view from that of suppliers, who in turn do not think exactly
83 as consultants and service providers or students. This study captured the perception of a wide and varied range
84 of stakeholders 9

85 3 II. Methodology Employed in Field

86 Research 11 and we believe that this diversity of opinions can help to avoid biases arising from the concentration
87 of opinions on a particular part of the industry.

88 The scope of the study is limited to the perspective of attracting investments and their expansion and does
89 not take into account the different theoretical approaches on which the problem could be studied. Like the work
90 of Duque Dutra (2017), we do not seek to analyse the extent to which the attraction of foreign investment to
91 Upstream contributes, or not, to the process of enriching a country, or what the policy of exploring natural
92 resources would be more appropriate for this wealth to effectively contribute to the development of a nation.
93 Also, we seek not to judge the performance and socioeconomic cost of the current models in the country. Our
94 study focuses on the economic perspective of oil and gas sector stakeholders, with emphasis on Brazilian and
95 foreign oil companies regarding the country's performance in 25 attributes associated with attractiveness. very
96 high productivity, excellent quality and high trade value. According to Oddone (2018), it is one of the best
97 opportunities in the world in terms of oil and gas. ??9 Given the limitations of a study measuring stakeholder
98 perception, this study defines "investment" simply as an expectation of those interviewed, without speculating or
99 making projections based on the responses. ??10 A term used in the oil industry that encompasses exploration,
100 drilling and production activities. ??11 A term used here in its broader meaning, comprising all those who have
101 an interest in the Upstream of the oil and natural gas sector.

102 i.

103 The Global Petroleum Survey, from the Fraser Institute (FRASER, 2012, 2016, 2018), provided the baseline
104 questionnaire with variables used in surveys that measure perceptions of oil and gas producing countries.

105 ii.

106 The book "Made in Brazil -Desafios Competitivos para a Indústria" (FERRAZ et al., 1996) contributed to
107 the understanding of the determinants of competitiveness that transcend the company level and are related to
108 the structure of industry and market, and the productive system as a whole.

109 iii.

110 The dissertation "Atratividade do Upstream da Indústria de Petróleo Brasileira -1997-2003" (Araújo, 2004)
111 ii. The Questionnaire It was structured with 25 close-ended questions related to attributes of the country and
112 the oil and gas sector and with 12 questions in order to collect data from the interviewee. For the evaluation of
113 the factors according to the levels of attractiveness or nonattractiveness towards investment, a scale of 1 (high
114 degree of discouragement to investment) to 5 (high ??012 By using criteria such as a variety of political systems,
115 regulatory and legal regimes and geological profiles, Araújo (2004) selected and analyzed the specific cases of the
116 following countries: The United Kingdom, the U.S.A., Brazil, Norway, Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, and the Congo.
117 For each nation, he applied a score of 1 to 5. Brazil ranked third in the overall ranking, behind the U.K. and
118 the U.S.A. ??113 Because it is research that uses the flow point method, neither Margin of Error nor Confidence
119 Interval apply. degree of encouragement) was used, 3 being a neutral position. The questionnaire was submitted
120 to a cognitive pre-test answered by 25 experts from the industry; after this procedure, it was reviewed and tested
121 on three interviewees; and then translated and diagrammed.

122 4 III.

123 5 Research Results

124 The 25 variables are briefly contextualized here, and the results are presented as figures showing the evolution of
125 the historical series, in the form of average, which shows the central tendency of the answers. With the support
126 of SPSS data analysis software, factorials which aggregated the issues in large thematic groups were created:
127 Trade, Regulatory, Prospective, and Business Environment.

128 6 a) Trade Issues

129 They involve six variables, shown in Government participations, such as royalties, special participations, area
130 retention rates.

131 Opposite the tax regime, which covers all companies, government participations focus only on Exploration &
132 Production activities of oil and gas. It is an indicator usually used to compare tax regimes. The tax burden
133 that is not specific to oil production, including personnel, business, payroll, and taxes on capital and income; the
134 complexity of complying with tax obligations.

135 Tax burden can be seen as the sum of all taxes -taxes, fees, and contributions -of the three levels of government
136 (Federal, State, and Municipal) -incurred on the economy.

137 7 Brazilian characteristics of the Concession Contract regime.

138 The concessionaire company has exclusive rights over the area granted during the contract period, recovering
139 costs and making profits through production, with which it pays its due obligations and taxes to the State.
140 Brazilian characteristics of the Production Sharing Contract regime.

141 Sharing contracts: i) operating costs belong to the company or consortium; ii) The result is divided into cost
142 oil, used to recover the incurred costs and profit oil, destined for the profit of the government and the companies
143 .

144 The Downstream market structure and its pricing policy.

145 It measures whether the Downstream and its market structure operate in competition, if they allow new
146 entrants and if they secure adequate remuneration (systematic of free prices, with the transfer of oscillations to
147 the domestic market).

148 Tariff/non-tariff commercial barriers to trade and restrictions on the repatriation of profits.

149 Law, regulation, policy, measure or practice that restricts foreign trade/for quantitative restrictions, import
150 licensing, customs procedures, antidumping, safeguards and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Source:
151 Authors', 2019.

152 1214 Cost oil reimburses the costs of the operation and amortization of the incurred investments; profit oil
153 is distributed among the governments and participating companies, according to the rules determined in the
154 contract, which may be a fixed or variable percentage (Gomes and Alves, 2007). As shown in Figure 1 below, the
155 variable Government Participations, identified in 2012 as neutral, with an average of 3.1, presented a decline and
156 constituted a slight tendency of discouragement towards investment. This fact could be related to collectibles
157 proposals presented by the Legislative Assembly and the Government of the State of Rio de Janeiro. The state
158 faces a context of fiscal contingencies (FIRJAN, 2017) and finds in the most crucial sector of the state a collectibles
159 explanation ??3 15 , which would bring unpredictability from the perspective of companies (CARNEIRO and
160 DELGADO, 2017). ??315 The 1.877/12 Bill, which creates the Oil and Gas Inspection Fee (TFPG). The 1.046/15

9 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS.

161 Bill, with the same objective. The 1.029/11 Bill, which creates the collection of ICMS tax on the consumption of
162 natural gas used in oil production. There is a growing perception that the Tax Burden discourages investments.
163 The issue emerges as the most rejected, with an average of 1.8 in 2018. The hypothesis is that this disapproval
164 is explained mostly by the complexity and cost to comply with the rules, then by the tax burden itself, today
165 at 32.4% (RFB, 2018), a position that tends to the intermediary. For comparison purposes, Mexico has a tax
166 burden of 16.6% of GDP; Denmark, of 45.9% (OECD, 2018). Although with less consensus, tariff/non-tariff
167 trade barriers and restrictions on repatriation of profits also undermine the attractiveness of E&P. They show
168 declining behaviour and, in 2018, their average drops to 2.3.

169 The Concession Contract is only neutral and does not represent an attribute capable of encouraging
170 investments, nor is it an obstacle for the interviewees. One can only infer the reasons for this perception:
171 a collectional tendency from bonus, a vital risk component that the concessionaire pays even before starting
172 the exploratory activity and the increase for the amount paid for the retention of area (IBP-UFRJ, 2016). The
173 Production Sharing Contract which, at the beginning of the series, did not comparatively present the performance
174 of the concession regime, improved its evaluation and outperformed its "competitor" in 2018, the concession
175 regime, despite additional costs of governance and risks arising from the need of approval of expenditures incurred
176 by projects. This result shows the flexibility of the companies in dealing with different regimes, but it can also
177 mean a judgment of the Pre-salt geological potential, as the sharing only covers this geological section. In fact,
178 the existence of a better contract cannot be affirmed. As Radon (2005) shows, each presents advantages and
179 disadvantages from several points of view, especially in its trade aspects.

180 Petrobras owns 98% of the country's refining (ANP, 2018) and considering the opinion of experts like Câmara
181 (2012) and Almeida (2012), its fuel trade policy for specific periods did not follow the basic concept of free prices
182 -monthly evaluations and transfer of international oscillations to the internal market. For those interviewed,
183 this Structure of the Downstream Market discourages investments towards Upstream. However, there is a slight
184 improvement, possibly due to carrying out the policy for derivative readjustment by the company in July 2017,
185 which was challenged by a truckers' strike in May 2018, demanding a reduction in the price of diesel 14 b)
186 Regulatory Issues 16 .

187 Compared to trade issues, the regulatory ones presented and defined in Table 2 below, are slightly better,
188 with three variables considered positive and three seen as negative ones. Despite the significant deterioration in
189 perception between 2014 and 2016, the variables recovered in 2018, except for the compatibility of regulations
190 among the levels of the federation. ??416 For more on fuel pricing policies and their different impacts on
191 society, including the truckers' strike, see Almeida and Soares (2018). Clarity of interpretation and stability of
192 business rules and whether changes are made with discretion, arbitrariness, and biased judgement, or unnecessary
193 frequency.

194 Complexity and cost of compliance with the laws. If interaction among those who make laws and companies
195 are allowed and encouraged, e.g., through public hearings.

196 Costs incurred in complying with regulatory determinations, including time, training of personnel and resources
197 for related activities, filing of declarations, attendance to inspections, among others.

198 8 Local Content Requirements.

199 Operators of exploratory blocks and basins under production must comply with certain percentages of local
200 purchases and assure the preference to the contracting of Brazilian suppliers when their offers have price, term
201 and quality equivalent to those of other suppliers.

202 9 Research and Development Requirements.

203 Concessionaires must invest in R&D 1% of the gross revenue generated by the basins of high profitability or a
204 large volume of production, being 50% of this amount in their facilities and the remaining 50% in universities or
205 R&D centres.

206 Performance of the regulatory agent.

207 It measures the perception of the ANP, whose assignment is to regulate, contract, and supervise the activities
208 of the oil, natural gas, and biofuel sectors.

209 Compatibility of regulations between federal, state and municipal levels.

210 It checks the functioning and harmony of the administrative competencies of the federative entities -Union,
211 States, and Municipalities -, which exercise them without a hierarchy of one entity over the other. Predictability
212 of changes in environmental regulations, environmental licensing, and areas to be protected (parks, indigenous
213 reserves, environmental reserves, marine life, archaeological sites).

214 It evaluates the functioning of the licensing process of activities of the oil and natural gas sector and the
215 predictability of its regulations. The following Figure 2 shows that the level reached by the variable Predictability
216 in administration, interpretation, and enforcement of regulations, and frequency of changes emphasizes the
217 existence of some instability of the regulations of the sector 1517 in the opinion of the interviewees. The result
218 of the issue that measures the Complexity and cost of compliance with the laws and if there is interaction
219 among those who make them and the companies indicates that it would be ??517 The remedy proposed by Levy
220 and Spiller (2009) to avoid these veers is the creation of three mechanisms that complement each other in the

improvement of a regulatory framework: i) considerable limitations with respect to the agency's discretion; ii) formal and informal limitations regarding possible changes in the regulatory system and iii) institutions that guarantee these limitations. According to the authors, this framework should be complemented by a set of specific rules capable of providing safeguards against opportunistic behavior coming from regulators. complex and costly to comply with rules in Brazil, as other studies indicate ??618 . It also places the discussion about the possibility of improving the effectiveness of the consultations and public hearings carried out by the National Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANP), the sector's regulatory body, whose process is transparent and democratic but sometimes discretionary when justifying whether or not to obey the proposals 17 ??719 An interesting approach on the subject can be found in Giserman (2015), which investigates who participates and who influences regulation in processes involving public consultations. According to the author, the characteristics of the regulated sectors help to shape their relationship with the regulator: large companies and concentrated sectors tend towards higher participation. The perception of Local Content reaches a level of neutrality, with an average of 3 points throughout the series. Going beyond the surface, we found a certain tendency in the answers: interviewees linked to the operators are more likely to judge the requirement an obstacle towards investment; in principle providers would be inclined to consider it encouraging. The underlying issue is that local content seems to arouse heated debate because it has the power to mobilize nationalistic sentiment. One cannot imagine the repetition of models of extraction of natural resources without the counterpart of the development of a local industry for supplying goods and services.

Operators seem to agree with this premise; however, the period that precedes the creation of a competitive supplier park is marked by conflict. Oil companies want a gradual increase in nationalization percentages, in order to ensure that prices, deadlines, and quality have little impact on their activities; suppliers and governments are pressing for a faster pace, seeking to secure the benefits as quickly as possible. On the other hand, in a scenario of fiscal fragility, governments are more likely to accept lower local content commitments in exchange for higher signature bonuses 18 in the short term, as was the case in Brazil between 2015 and 2017 (Cintra, 2017). On the other hand, the R&D requirements, with an expressive average score throughout the historical series, stand out positively in the interviewees' perception. Despite this result, there is a union of actors in defence of the enhancement of the PD&I Clause (acronym in Brazilian 18 The Signature Bonus is a traditional selection criterion in the biddings. The bonus value is associated with the expectations of companies regarding the productive potential of the disputed blocks and the competitiveness level for the area in the bid round.

Portuguese for Research, Development and Innovation Clause) of the ANP. They propose that the resources can be used for the development of the supply chain in the country and that the industrial property of the assets generated by the projects follows federal legislation and not specific restrictive rules created by the ANP (IBP, 2017; ABESPETRO, 2018). Authors such as Florentino (2016) warn the ANP to stay tuned "so that its action changes the relative costs of technological activities for the benefit of society and does not impose costs that prevent positive returns to all agents".

The perception of the role of the ANP, which was deteriorating -average score of 3.3 (2012), 3.2 (2014), and 2.9 (2016) -is recovering and reverses the trend in 2018. For those interviewed, the role of the regulator body is not clearly encouraging towards investment nor does it represent an obstacle. The variable that measures the Compatibility of regulations among the federal, state and municipal levels shows pronounced disharmony in the Brazilian federalism and impairs the attractiveness of Upstream, with an average of 2.3 in 2018. Concerning the Predictability of changes in the regulations of the environmental area related to environmental licensing, there is discouragement towards investment. From the oil companies' perspective, this negative view results from the licensing process, as they believe it could be faster and more predictable. The Brazilian Institute of Oil, Gas, and Biofuels (IBP, the acronym in Brazilian Portuguese), an entity representative of the oil companies, defends the environmental assessment of the blocks offered before the bidding. In the opinion of the entity, the environmental assessment of the sedimentary area and the previous mapping of the socioeconomic impacts of the area to be tendered would contribute to making the licensing process agile, predictable and transparent (IBP, 2017). It is a controversial subject, difficult to be compared with other countries, and differently conceived. According to Verocai (2004), environmental licensing as practiced in Brazil is practically unique worldwide, which prevents a confrontation of deadlines ??921 .

10 c) Prospective Issues

In the interviewees' assessment, the Prospective issues (described in Table ??) are encouraging towards investment, except for Petrobras' stake of 30% and its role as an operator in all blocks of the Pre-Salt.

11 Table 3: Definition of Prospective Issues

12 Group

Issue Definition

13 Prospective Issues

Availability of geological data, its quality and detail, and ease of access to public data.

14 PHYSICAL SECURITY OF PERSONS AND GOODS.

279 It measures whether BDEP 2022 provides with integrity, safety, and efficiency the data generated by the E&P
280 activities, such as wells (stratigraphic, exploratory and of production) and seismic surveys (2D and 3D).

281 The geological potential of the onshore sedimentary basins.

282 Brazil has 29 sedimentary basins of petroleum interest, with an area of 6,436,200 km², being 76% in land and
283 24% in the sea (ANP, 2012). Of these, 13 exclusively terrestrial basins and nine which extend from the land to
284 the sea.

285 The geological potential of the offshore sedimentary basins.

286 It measures perceptions about the geological potential of the offshore sedimentary basins.

287 Petrobras' stake of 30% and its role as an operator in all blocks of the Pre-Salt.

288 Law 12.351/2010 changed the regulatory framework of the sector and assigned to Petrobras the obligation of
289 being the operator of all blocks of the sharing regime, with a minimum participation of 30%.

290 A new change made participation optional. Source: Authors', 2019 ??022 Exploration and Production
291 Database from ANP.

292 Figure 3 (below) presents the performance of the Prospectivity Issues. The availability of geological data, its
293 quality and detail, and the ease of access to public data represent an encouraging factor towards investment in
294 the Brazilian E&P. The issue presents a high and growing average throughout the series. In turn, the potential of
295 the onshore basins, with an average of 3.5 in the four editions, is a positive factor. The geological potential of the
296 offshore basins is considered highly attractive and stands out among the 25 factors as the most encouraging one
297 towards investment, with a remarkable average of 4.3 points in the four surveys. Even after becoming optional,
298 the controversial Petrobras' stake of 30% and its role as an operator in all blocks of the Pre-Salt is not seen
299 as encouraging towards investment 2123 and is among the five most poorly evaluated, with an average of 2.6
300 in 2018. An explanation for this perception would be the interpretation that the rule broke the conditions of
301 isonomy that prevailed in the auctions of exploratory blocks. ??123 Although the legislative amendment of 2016
302 transformed this participation, optional for the winning consortia, the issue was retained as the proposal was still
303 being processed during the execution of this research. Since it is still a relevant issue, we retained it in adapted
304 form in 2018. The issues that assess the Business Environment are presented and defined in Table 4. Although
305 they declined between 2014 and 2016, they show vigorous recovery, except for political stability. It measures the
306 level of risk of inconvertibility and transfer of currency, expropriation, breach of contract, political interference,
307 supply chain disruption, legal and regulatory risk, and political violence.

308 Legal system is fair, transparent, non-corrupt and efficient.

309 It assesses, from the respondents' perspective, whether the legal system functions appropriately, and whether
310 it is capable of limiting administrative discretionary and avoiding eventual improper political interferences.

311 The legal framework of labour legislation.

312 Set of legal norms, principles, and other legal sources governing labour relations, regulating the legal status of
313 workers.

314 14 Physical security of persons and goods.

315 It measures to what degree the fundamental rights of citizenship, such as the right to life, property, and personal
316 security, are guaranteed in the country. Availability of skilled work at the middle, senior and managerial levels.

317 It evaluates the supply and quality of skilled work at the middle, senior and managerial levels.

318 Quality of infrastructure, including access to roads, pipelines, energy availability, etc.

319 Availability and quality of infrastructure, including roads, railways, pipelines, ports, and supply of electricity
320 and telecommunications.

321 Provider park of equipment and services.

322 The supply chain covers the set of companies that produce goods and/or provide services, directly or indirectly,
323 for Upstream activities in the sector: exploration, development of production, and production. The following
324 Figure 4 shows the results of the business environment issues throughout the research series. As one would
325 expect from a country that has experienced an impeachment process, the issue of Political Stability has dropped
326 sharply, from a highly favourable perspective towards investment, averaging 3.8 points in 2012, to an average of
327 2.4 in 2016, and repeating the negative performance in 2018. Among the characteristics evaluated by business
328 executives at the time of investing, government stability is a determining factor, although, as North (1996)
329 points out, the very decision-making process of economic and political agents is permeated by subjectivity and
330 uncertainty. The issue that assesses whether the Brazilian legal system is fair, transparent, non-corrupt and
331 efficient, which reached a negative level in 2014 and 2016, achieved a significant recovery in 2018 and returned
332 to neutrality. The reason for this change does not appear easy to discover and one can only speculate that it is
333 related to the controversial protagonist role of the Judiciary at the heart of the political debate of the country.
334 Contrary to current opinion about the physical security of persons and goods, the issue improves and reaches a
335 moderately encouraging average in 2018, with 3.3 points.

336 In the 2012 edition of the survey, Brazil was experiencing accelerated economic growth, with repercussions on
337 the Availability of skilled labour at the middle, senior and managerial levels. That year, the variable came close
338 to discouraging investments, with an average of 2.9. The scenario changed and given the idleness of personnel as
339 a result of the economic crisis, the issue became encouraging, with a considerable average of 3.6 in 2018.

340 The legal framework of labour and labour legislation is another variable whose behaviour has fluctuated.

341 Following a moderately sloped plan, it recovers to an average of 2.8 in 2018, one year after the Labour Reform,
342 which relaxed specific points of the legislation and was considered progress from the companies' perspective.
343 Quality of infrastructure, including access to roads, pipelines and energy in particular -which were among the
344 most negative variables -improves and reaches an average of 2.9 in 2018. The provider of equipment and services
345 boasts a gradual and consistent improvement in its perception and encourages investments. In the four editions
346 of the research, the infrastructure of universities and technological and research centres is considered attractive
347 for investment.

348 **15 IV.**

349 **16 Summary of Results**

350 A panoramic view of the 25 variables measured in Figure 5 shows that the attractiveness conditions of the Brazilian
351 Upstream deteriorated throughout the historical series and recovered in the last two years. The country, which
352 averaged 3.1 points on the sum of the issues in 2012, saw its position fall to 3 in 2014, drop to 2.9 in 2016 and
353 finally reach 3.05 in 2018.

354 © 2020 Global Journals The trade issues concentrating the variables were considered unfavourable for the
355 attraction of investments for the Brazilian Upstream in the opinion the interviewees. The contracts are the two
356 positive exceptions among the six issues associated with the trade issue. The country's tax burden and the
357 complexity of its compliance emerge as the most rejected.

358 The regulatory issues perform slightly better. The negative highlight is the Compatibility of regulations among
359 the levels of the federation, which points to a certain lack of coordination among government instances. The
360 variable that measures the complexity and cost of legal compliance is also highlighted as a dissuasive factor. The
361 general conditions have improved but are still far from encouraging investments.

362 In the interviewees' opinion, the issues regarding prospectivity are encouraging towards investment, except for
363 Petrobras' stake of 30% and its role as an operator in the Pre-Salt blocks. Significant average scores are achieved
364 by the geological potential of the offshore basins, highly stimulating to induce investment in the Brazilian E&P.
365 With less exuberance but with a high level of favourable evaluation, the potentiality of the onshore basins appears
366 with an average score of 3.5 over the four editions. The issue of availability of geological data and its ease of
367 access is seen as increasingly encouraging towards investment, reaching 3.5 in 2018.

368 The interpretation of the grouping of the eight variables representative of the business environment established
369 for companies operating in the Brazilian Upstream clearly shows advancements of various issues, except for
370 political stability. Despite this, the levels reached are not high, authorizing the interpretation that transforming
371 the business environment of the sector into a more stable and/or predictable one would be relevant for the
372 consistency of its attractiveness.

373 V.

374 **17 Analysis via Logit Model**

375 The average score of the 25 attractiveness factors presented a certain dynamic with alternation of placements
376 over time. The extreme positions, the one that most encourages and the one that most discourages investment,
377 however, have remained practically constant. Although each edition of the research presents singular results,
378 the data seem to indicate the presence of a pattern. The potential of the offshore sedimentary basins has
379 emerged as the most stimulating factor to invest in the Brazilian Upstream (see Table 5 below). The R&D
380 requirements (among the three variables best positioned in three editions) and the infrastructure of universities
381 and technology centres (twice among the three-best positioned) also stand out. Other issues present a strong but
382 unstable performance over time.

383 **18 Factors that least encourage investment**

384 Tax burden and complexity of its compliance Legal system is fair, transparent, noncorrupt and efficient

385 **19 Tax burden and complexity of its compliance**

386 Tax burden and complexity of its compliance Source: Authors', 2019.

387 On the other hand, the tax burden, and the complexity of complying with tax obligations appear as the variable
388 that most discourages investments in Upstream. It is only in 2014 that this variable loses, by a narrow margin,
389 this uncomfortable position, when it is outpaced by the issue of whether the Legal system is fair, transparent,
390 non-corrupt and efficient.

391 The average is the most used measure of central tendency and an important reference to represent a set of
392 data because it more uniformly blends the lower and higher values and thus produces fewer errors. Despite these
393 average attributes, the repeating pattern of results in leadership positions encouraged the refinement of the data
394 to obtain possibly more robust conclusions.

395 Thus, for checking, the criterion of variable measurement was changed. It was established as a prerequisite to
396 be considered the interviewee's answer to the question, present in the questionnaire, whether one would "invest
397 or not in Brazil in the next two years." Thus, the determinant of attractiveness went beyond the average score

21 CONCLUSIONS

398 reached by the variables. For example, if the average reached by a variable is high, but it is the same for both
399 groups, that is, for those who intend and also for those who do not intend to invest, it would not be possible
400 to conclude that it is a determinant for attractiveness. Since the variable is binary, we chose the Logit method,
401 whose models were arranged to understand the relationship between the scores attributed by the respondents to
402 the 25 factors investigated and their answer to the question about "investing in Brazil in the next two years." Two
403 rounds of models were made: (1) Linear regression with Logit with all variables; and (2) 25 linear regressions
404 with each variable individually.

405 Binary variables were created for each of the 25 factors surveyed. All variables, as well as their responses,
406 were transformed to become binary and thus able to compose the statistical model. Issues that reached grade 4
407 or 5, that is, which encouraged investment, received a value of 1; the remaining scores were assigned a value of
408 0. Thus, an indicator variable of encouragement associated with that factor (which is associated with a question
409 from the questionnaire). In this manner, in summary, one would have: a) Dependent Variable: One intends to
410 invest in Brazil in the next two years; b) Independent variable: Indicator for the factors associated with each
411 question in the questionnaire.

412 Operationally, these variables were all included in the model in order to verify which demonstrate adherence
413 to their explanatory significance. The model (shown in the following Figure 6) employing a screen copy of the
414 Phyton Software shows the relation of the 25 questions to the dependent variable. The result shows that the only
415 variables that present the signal equal to the theoretical signal and that are significant to 10% are questions 18
416 (Political Stability) and 21 (Physical security of people and goods). That is, we can measure the interest in the
417 investment from the result of the independent variables checked in the survey. The possible dependent variable
418 in the questionnaire was the intention to invest in Brazil within the next two years. The others were used as
419 independent variables.

420 In the Logit model, it is essential to be aware of the "p-value", represented by "p>z", positioned in the
421 fourth column. The significant values in the model are those that are below 0.1, an acceptable value of the
422 statistical agreement for the significance of variables. Some questions are significant: geological potential of
423 the onshore sedimentary basins (Question 15); political stability (Question 18); physical security of persons and
424 goods (Question 21) and quality of infrastructure, including access to roads, pipelines, availability of energy, etc.
425 (Question 23).

426 However, as we aimed to measure the capability of attractiveness towards investments from the research
427 instrument and the statistical model, we looked for variables that indicated a positive theoretical signal to
428 attract investment. That is noticeable from the second column of Figure 6, represented by the "dy/dx". Only
429 two variables, among the significant ones, showed positive values: political stability (question 18) and physical
430 security of people and goods (question 21). That is, the greater the political stability and the physical security
431 of people and goods, the higher the encouragement for investment, which was statistically proven.

432 After this procedure, we used the two significant questions as independent variables to explain the desire to
433 invest in Brazil, both being the only ones of the model, removing all others. In the Logit model regarding Political
434 Stability, it was possible to identify that the fact of assigning grades 4 or 5 to the importance of this question
435 to attractiveness increases the chance of investing in Brazil in the next two years by 8.7%. The result is still
436 meaningful at the 5% level, a statistical value taken as a reference for significance. In the model of the physical
437 security of people and goods, granting high marks increases the chance of investing in the country in the next two
438 years by 4.6%. Significance reaches the level of 10%, a less rigid value, but also widely accepted as a paradigm
439 of significance.

440 Therefore, the data allow us to generally infer that the desire to invest in Brazil is affected by the assessments
441 of the Brazilian Upstream. The two variables presented are significant, with a greater prominence for Political
442 Stability.

443 20 VI.

444 21 Conclusions

445 The study constitutes a comprehensive view of the attributes of the Brazilian natural gas and oil sector and of
446 the country itself, identifying strengths and weaknesses in four central themes: trade, regulatory, prospectivity
447 and business environment. The methodological tools used seem to have been consistent with the intended
448 purpose, making it possible to elucidate questions, statistically confirm current opinions and obtain original
449 information. The conclusions indicate that the Brazilian Upstream, in the perception of industry stakeholders,
450 exerts considerable influence in attracting investments, despite its unstable performance. It is assumed that the
451 country has lost part of its capacity to motivate investments due to: i.

452 Changes in its regulatory apparatus were not considered a necessary evolution, but are elements of instability
453 and uncertainty which ended up obstructing the process of exploratory block bidding rounds for five years. That
454 is the case of the law that assigned Petrobras the role of the operator in all blocks of the Pre-salt, with a
455 minimum participation of 30% in the winning consortia. This arrangement altered the symmetry that existed
456 between Petrobras and the other companies and changed the competitive environment of the sector, altering the
457 isonomy that prevailed through the concession auctions since 1999. Although it is a controversial subject, that

458 arouses nationalistic passions, a considerable part of the respondents seem to have considered that the process
459 of change occurred in an untimely manner; ii.

460 Deterioration of the economic environment and political stability. The country has had one of the biggest crises
461 in its history in the last five years, combining economic and political aspects. The political crisis culminated with
462 the impeachment of a president; the economic crisis was mixed with a major corruption scandal, initially centred
463 on Petrobras, and investigated by a task force of institutions, which resulted in arrests, ousting and arraignments
464 of hundreds of politicians and businesspeople. In 2015, the rise of Vice-President Michel Temer, whose mandate
465 was marked by accusations, did not pacify the political environment; and iii.

466 Fragility of the outcome of trade issues and certain regulatory variables and the business environment emphasize
467 structural and bureaucratic obstacles that undermine Brazil's capability to attract more investment and remain
468 as tasks of the economic agenda. Despite significant advances in several fields, from the perspective of a relevant
469 percentage of respondents, the Country has not yet solved issues that place it as a not entirely business-friendly
470 environment, although of high potentiality.

471 On the other hand, the country has highly encouraging natural conditions for investment, such as its geological
472 potential offshore (mainly) and onshore. The availability of resources for R&D, guaranteed by the 1% Clause
473 of the ANP, combined with a sophisticated trajectory of the sector's supplier of goods and services and with
474 the vigorous investment program of the leading operators, especially Petrobras, has the potential to promote
475 vigorous growth of the sector, aiding its international competitiveness. Such a combination can bring significant
476 results for the development of the country. That was the case with the four largest oil service industry hubs-
477 the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, and France-which began by promoting efforts to explore and
478 develop national hydrocarbons and made those countries more attractive for investment.

479 As Bret-Rouzaut and Favenne (2011) argue, "the UK oil services industry has been developed internationally
480 in tandem with its success in the domestic market." Norway had a shy start in the 70s, but by cooperating
481 with other countries, learning from their experiences and adopting policies to support the "infant industry," it
482 achieved esteemed technological empowerment by using its market as a springboard for its international expansion
483 (RYGGVIK, 2014 and GUIMARÃES, 2011). In France, an oil-poor country, the state has played a crucial role in
484 the internal growth and development of the para-oil services industry. Brazil, on the other hand, needs to ensure
485 isonomic conditions of competition to Brazilian suppliers, not only for improving the business environment but
486 also for macroeconomic issues such as taxes, interest rates and foreign exchange (CNI, 2019).

487 The determinants of complex decision-making processes are usually plural and interrelated. The single
488 explanations are not enough. If, however, we attempt synthesis, we must recognize that in the oil industry,
489 the risk-reward binomial is treated differently compared to other sectors of the economy. Thus, although all 25
490 variables have been carefully chosen and have an intrinsic value to characterize the perception of attractiveness,
491 a hierarchy from the Pre-Test with 25 experts from the sector places two of them in the first positions: offshore
492 and onshore geological potential. The third would be political stability. Logit analysis, thereby, confirms the
493 importance of political stability and identifies the relevance of the physical security of goods and people (the
494 closely related variable to political stability).

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497 23 ()

498 No other sector is capable of rewarding risk as oil does. Evidence for this is that even countries with fragile
499 institutions and even those in civil war, such as Iraq and Libya, are able to attract investment if their relevant
500 geological variables (volumes and dynamics of accumulation, for example) are good and whether general market
501 trends (oil price and demand for derivatives in particular) are favourable. Despite receiving investments, these
502 countries pay a high price because companies usually use a discount rate that reflects the degree of risk involved.

503 Therefore, despite unfavourable assessments in several variables, Brazil meets unique conditions due to its
504 geological potential, especially offshore. If the potential attributed by nature is considerable, however, it is up to
505 the country to improve institutional conditions. The geological predicate must not operate on its own and must
506 be in line with other favourable attributes, since all these conditions can help the country increase the share of
507 government oil income and enable an ambitious natural resource exploration model, capable of internalizing the
508 benefits of this wealth widely. Therefore, an agenda for improving attractiveness is needed, since the resources
509 of oil and natural gas, if properly applied, have the potential to make Brazil a more egalitarian country, prepare
510 it for energy transition and improve its goods and services industry, making it competitive internationally.

511 Attractiveness matters and can materialize in increasing a nation's oil income and multiple other benefits;
512 however, a warning is warranted. As Stiglitz (2005) states, generally countries rich in natural resources perform
513 worse than those with smaller amounts of resources, but not all have the same fate. Forty years ago, Indonesia
514 and Nigeria had similar per capita incomes, and both relied heavily on oil revenues. Indonesia's per capita
515 income is now four times higher than that of Nigeria, which has even fallen. There is a vast theory about rentier
516 states. The question is also addressed by Evans (2004) in his definition of the Predatory State from the example
517 of the Democratic Republic of Congo (ex-Zaire). That seems to be the reality of some municipalities in the

518 Northern Fluminense ??224 , where resources from oil royalties while potentially vital have not transformed poor
 519 municipalities into prosperous and sustainable economies on their own. An extensive set of studies in Brazil and
 520 abroad shows that not only is there no direct correlation between oil wealth and economic development, but in
 521 many cases, there appears to be a negative correlation 23 ??224 One of the six meso-regions of the state of Rio de
 522 Janeiro, formed by nine municipalities that concentrate oil production of the Campos Basin, especially Campos
 dos Goytacazes and Macaé. 1 2 3 4 5 6




Figure 1:

523

¹The definition used here for "Pre-Salt" refers to the section geologically limited by the occurrence of carbonate rocks, in the Santos and Campos basins, underneath salt layers of the Aptian age (Papaterra, 2010). Pre-Salt, whose pioneering discovery was made by Petrobras, is characterized by large accumulations of light oil, with

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³Upstream Attractiveness of the Brazilian oil and Natural Gas Sector: An Assessment based on the Stakeholders' Perceptions

⁴Doing Business 2019 (WORLD BANK, 2019), for example, points out that Brazil is one of the countries in the world where it takes more time to deal with the tax bureaucracy. The payment of the tax itself is only one of the stages of a bureaucratic process, preceded by calculations of the value of the tax, forms, and analysis of norms, assessment of possible discounts or tax credits.

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


Figure 2: 8 .




Figure 3: 4 Global




Figure 4: Figure 1 :




Figure 5: 6 Global

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Optimization terminated successfully.
  Current function value: 0.167725
  Iterations 9
  Logit Marginal Effects
=====
Dep. Variable:                      5
Method:                            dydx
At:                               overall
=====
          dy/dx      std err      z      P>|z|      [0.025      0.975]
-----
p1      0.0282      0.027     1.045      0.296      -0.025      0.081
p2     -0.0173      0.037     -0.473      0.636      -0.089      0.055
p3     -0.0215      0.036     -0.600      0.548      -0.092      0.049
p4      0.0336      0.032     1.064      0.287      -0.028      0.095
p5      0.0111      0.030     0.371      0.711      -0.047      0.070
p6      0.0105      0.026     0.404      0.686      -0.040      0.061
p7     -0.0218      0.026     -0.823      0.410      -0.074      0.030
p8      0.0144      0.028     0.517      0.605      -0.040      0.069
p9      0.0291      0.027     1.072      0.284      -0.024      0.082
p10     0.0142      0.032     0.442      0.659      -0.049      0.077
p11     0.0390      0.031     1.247      0.213      -0.022      0.100
p12     -0.0310      0.030     -1.036      0.300      -0.090      0.028
p13     -0.0154      0.030     -0.512      0.608      -0.074      0.043
p14      0.0401      0.035     1.140      0.254      -0.029      0.109
p15     -0.1106      0.065     -1.692      0.091      -0.239      0.018
p16     -0.0198      0.063     -0.313      0.754      -0.144      0.104
p17     -0.0094      0.028     -0.338      0.735      -0.064      0.045
p18      0.0939      0.042     2.260      0.024      0.012      0.175
p19     -0.0272      0.030     -0.896      0.370      -0.087      0.032
p20     -0.0068      0.031     -0.222      0.825      -0.067      0.053
p21      0.0476      0.027     1.751      0.080      -0.006      0.101
p22     -0.0086      0.034     -0.251      0.802      -0.076      0.059
p23      0.0436      0.030     1.450      0.147      -0.015      0.103
p24     -0.0781      0.040     -1.931      0.054      -0.157      0.001
p25     -0.0184      0.033     -0.562      0.574      -0.083      0.046
2 =====

```

Figure 6: 19. Figure 2 :

1

below. Two of them, concession and sharing contracts, are favourable; four do not contribute to Upstream attractiveness, with emphasis on the tax burden, with pronounced discouragement towards investment. Trade issues, however, tend towards improvement in 2018.

Figure 7: Table 1

1

Group	Issue	Definition
Trade		
Issues		

Figure 8: Table 1 :

2

Group	Issue	Definition
Predictability interpretation, regulations that affect the sector, and concern about the frequency of changes.	in administration, and enforcement of	
Regulatory Issues		

Figure 9: Table 2 :

4

Group	Issue	Definition
Business environment	Political stability.	

Figure 10: Table 4 :

5

	2012	2014	2016	2018
	Potential of the offshore sedimentary basins	Potential of the offshore sedimentary basins	Potential of the offshore sedimentary basins	Potential of the offshore sedimentary basins
Factors that most in-vest-ment en-cour-age	Political stability	R&D requirements	Infrastructure technology centres of universities and	R&D requirements
R&D require-ments	Infrastructure uni-versities technology centres of and	Potential of the onshore sedimentary basins	Availability of skilled labour	of

Figure 11: Table 5 :

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