

1 Impact of Corporate Governance on Financial Performance: A 2 Study on DSE listed Insurance Companies in Bangladesh

3 Nibedita Datta¹

4 ¹ Ishakha International University Bangladesh

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6

7 **Abstract**

8 Corporate governance involves promoting the compliance of law in letter spirit and
9 demonstrating ethical conduct. This study is conducted to examine the impact of corporate
10 governance on the performance of insurance companies. The respective study is conducted to
11 apprehend the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (board size, board
12 composition, board meetings and board audit committee) and performance of the insurance
13 company. The population for this study defined as listed insurance companies in DSE. The
14 sample comprises of 10 listed insurance companies. Various tests like- Descriptive analysis,
15 multiple linear regression, Pearson correlation and collinearity statistics have been performed
16 using IBM SPSS statistics software. Mainly secondary sources of data are using for the period
17 of 2010 to 2016. This study finds that the corporate governance has an impact on the
18 performance of the insurance sector in Bangladesh. The independent variables of corporate
19 governance (board size, board composition, board meetings and board audit committee)
20 determine 38.20 percent of the performance (ROE) variance. Using Pearson correlation, the
21 results provide evidence of a positive relationship between board sizes and ROE as well as
22 board meetings. The result further reveals that a negative relationship between ROE and
23 board composition. However, the study could not provide any association between
24 performances of the insurance (ROE) and board audit committee.

25

26 **Index terms**— corporate governance, listed insurance companies, board size, board audit committee, board
27 composition, and return on equity.

28 **1 Introduction**

29 The effect of corporate governance on organization's performance is a crucial issue since the last financial distress
30 over the world. Many accounting scandals and numerous cases of corporate governance malpractice brought
31 about more attention to corporate governance along with business integrity issues. Thus the issue of corporate
32 governance is a serious factor in economic growth and financial markets steadiness. "Corporate Governance is
33 the system by which organizations are directed and controlled" (Uk-Cadbury Report, London 1992) [7]. Various
34 notable corporate scandals and collapses like-Enron, WorldCom, etc., where there is an attachment of unethical
35 practices, and people are now pensive about their present and future protection for various purposes like health
36 protection, educational protection and so on. Insurance companies are providing those opportunities to make it
37 real. They provide unique financial services to the growth and development of every economy. Now people are
38 concerned about the performance of the entity where they invest their money. Though the stringent governing
39 framework, organization performs a weak role in practicing corporate governance code of conduct. "Corporate
40 governance creates a set of relationship between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other
41 stakeholders by providing a structure through which the objectives of the company are determined and the means
42 of attaining the objectives and monitoring the determined performance" (OECD-2004) [13]. Therefore this study

7 SAMPLE

43 is apprehended to establish a relationship between corporate governance and performance of insurance companies.
44 It also measures how the insurance companies in Bangladesh are responding to the corporate governance guidelines
45 set by the Bangladesh securities & Exchange Commission (BSEC) authority and finally the impact of corporate
46 governance appliances on measuring the performance of the insurance companies in Bangladesh. However, the
47 findings will provide data for the development of effective corporate governance practices in this sector.

48 2 II.

49 3 Literature Review

50 The study examined the relationship between four corporate governance mechanisms like board size, no. of
51 independent director in the board, chief executive officer duality & board audit committee and value of the
52 firm measure like ROA & ROE. The sample of this study were 93 DSE listed non-financial companies in 2006.
53 The researcher of the study revealed a positive and significant relationship between ROA & Board Independent
54 Director at 5% level and ROA and Chief Executive Duality at 10% level (Abdur Rouf, Md. 2011) [1] . But by using
55 a Structural Equation Modeling the researcher arrived that some governance mechanisms had positive covariance,
56 while some had negative covariance and thus the study appeared at no consistent and significant relationship
57 between governance mechanisms and financial performance (Azim, M.I 2012) [6] . On the other hand, a study
58 on 28 listed manufacturing firms in Sri Lanka exposed that there was no significant mean different between the
59 firm performance among CG practices as board leadership structure, board committees, board meetings and
60 proportion of non-executive directors (Achchuthan, S. & Kajanathan, R. 2013) [2] . The corporate governance
61 and corporate financial performance were correlated and the governance ratings of the company had a significant
62 positive impact on its financial performance, this research finding may support the decision of the company to
63 improve its governance structure. In this paper, the researcher investigated the impact of corporate governance
64 on corporate financial performance in an Indian context, using a sample of 20 companies listed on S&P CNX
65 Nifty 50 Index during the year of 2010 to 2012 (Aggarwal, P. 2013) [3]. The researcher attempts to investigate
66 the relationship between board mechanisms (audit committee size, audit committee composition, board size,
67 and board composition) and firm performance (ROA) based on the annual reports of listed companies in the
68 year 2011 of non-financial firms in the Saudi Market. For this study, data collected from a sample of 102 non-
69 financial listed companies, and the study could not provide a significant relationship between the size of the
70 audit committee and firm performance where it showed an insignificant relationship between board size and
71 firm performance (AhidGhabayen, Md. 2012) [4] .However, Klein et al. (2005) [10] used four control variables,
72 which were size, advantage, growth, profit variability and indicated that corporate governance does matter in
73 Canada, and that size was consistently negatively related to performance. The linkage of corporate governance
74 ratings and financial performance of the organization found positive but not significant (Van de Velde et al.
75 2005) [14] , and this observation found to be consistent with the findings of Gompers et al. 2003 [9] . A positive
76 association between corporate governance scores (after adjusting for industry effects) and financial performance
77 of firm (based on dividend payout, yield, profitability and shareholder returns) found in the study of Weir, Laing,
78 and Mcknight (2012) [15] .

79 4 III.

80 5 Research Objectives

81 This paper aims to identify the practices in different corporate governance issues like the level of board size and
82 its commitment to the corporate governance, effective board practices, and independent director and information
83 disclosures along with corporate compliance annexure in the annual report. Along with this, the study aims
84 to achieve the following objectives: 1. To examine the relation between corporate governance and financial
85 performance of selected insurance companies; and 2. To provide an overview of corporate governance practices
86 in the insurance sector in Bangladesh.

87 IV.

88 6 Research Methodology

89 Data Data on corporate governance practices and the insurance performance collected from mainly secondary
90 sources. The secondary sources of data were found from Annual reports, DSE, Journal, and articles and company
91 website, etc.

92 7 Sample

93 The sample comprises of ten (10) listed insurance companies from the population in Dhaka stock exchange for the
94 periods of 2010 to 2016. The selected samples are mainly general insurance company. However, it is mentioned
95 that insurance companies have been selected based on the availability of data on the corporate governance
96 practices and insurance performance of the listed insurance companies in Bangladesh.

97 8 Data Analysis Tool

98 To interpret the data regarding the corporate governance practices of insurance companies the checklist of
99 the selected sample companies is used. Various tests like-Descriptive Statistics, multiple regression analysis,
100 correlation and collinearity statistics have been performed using IBM SPSS software to investigate the impact of
101 corporate governance on the financial performance of the insurance companies.

102 9 d) Hypothesis Development H 1 :

103 There is a no relationship between board size and financial performance by insurance companies in Bangladesh.
104 H 2 : There is a no relation between the board composition and financial performance by insurance companies.
105 H 3 : There is a no relationship between board meetings and financial performance of insurance companies.
106 H 4 : There is a no relation between audit committee composition and performance of insurance companies.
107 V.

108 10 Research Model

109 The multiple linear regression model is used to examine the relationship between the performance of selected
110 insurance companies in DSE and Board size, board composition, board meeting and audit committee. The
111 result of regression analysis is an equation that represents the best prediction of a dependent variable from
112 several independent variables. This method formulates when the independent variables are correlated with one
113 another and with the dependent variable. The following regression equation is estimated as follow:Insurance
114 performance= ?0 + ?1 BOD SIZE + ?2 BOD COMP + ?3 BOD MEET+?4 AC SIZE + ? Where VI.

115 11 Results & Discussion

116 The study presents the analysis of the relationship between CG variables and insurance company's performance
117 variable using the data from the sample. Moreover, this chapter represents the findings of this study. The chapter
118 has three sections. First, descriptive statistics, following by correlation analysis, then multiple linear regression
119 are described. The final section discusses the results. The above table-2 shows that the mean of board size is
120 approximately 16.01 with maximum twenty (20) and minimum ten (10) members. Regarding the BOD Size, the
121 codes of corporate governance in Bangladesh require that the board of directors should consist of at least five (5)
122 directors and twenty (20) directors as a maximum. BSEC also assert that one-fifth (1/5) of the board of directors
123 in the company's board shall be independent directors. This table indicates that the average independent director
124 number is 1.93 with standard deviation 98%. So the insurance company's no. of the independent director is an
125 approximately 2 of the no. of the board of directors. Here, the mean of the board meeting is 7.46 with maximum
126 16 and minimum 4. Rules provide that the audit committee should have a minimum three (3) members in
127 Bangladesh. The mean of audit committee size is 4.14 while the maximum and minimum are seven (7) and three
128 (3) respectively. Therefore it is clear that the audit committee in the insurance companies in DSE have more
129 than three members on average.

130 The following table represents the result of correlation variables regarding the impact of corporate governance
131 on insurance performance. Source: Data manipulated by using SPSS Table 3 summarizes the correlation between
132 the independent variables and dependent variables. The table displays that, BOD size and BOD meetings
133 are positively related to the performance (ROE) of the insurance companies. The relationship between Board
134 compositions (no. of the independent director) is significantly negative. However, audit committee (AC SIZE)
135 is not related to the performance of the insurance companies and also show a negative relation on the table.
136 Furthermore, the table also represents the correlation between the independent variables to each other. It shows
137 no relationship between board size and audit committee. However, board size has a positive impact with Board
138 composition and Board meeting which means that the size of the board of directors plays a significant role in
139 determining the number of independent director.

140 Besides the table also reveals that Board composition (ID) has a significant positive relationship with the audit
141 committee, which means that a large board composition leads to a large audit committee. However, the audit
142 committee has no relation with other independent variables. Model summary: The table depicts the result that
143 out of four variables three variables have the direct positive impact on output at one percent level of significance.
144 Therefore, for one percent increase in Board size, Board meeting and Audit committee, the ROE is increased
145 by 0.197, 0.474, and 0.057 percent respectively. Only one variable Board composition of independent director
146 has a negative impact on output. It also implies that decreasing of one percent of BOD COMP will increase
147 the ROE by 0.292 percent. The presence of multicollinearity, the study pursue with the value of VIF for the
148 independent variables. It denotes that the VIF value for each independent variable is insignificant and less than
149 ten which indicates the estimated result of the model for ROE concerning the independent variables Board size,
150 Board composition, Board meeting and Audit committee is free from multicollinearity.

151 12 VII.

152 13 Findings

153 The table no. 3 denotes the result of CG variables (Board size, Board composition, Board meeting and Audit
154 committee) and performance of insurance company (ROE). The first hypothesis states that the Board size and the
155 insurance company's performance has no relationship. The analysis exhibits the Board size has positive relation
156 with the performance and, the first hypothesis disproves. However, few studies found similar results of this study.
157 Alhassan, Bajaher& Alsherhri (2015) investigated the relationship between Board size and performance of Banks
158 (ROA) in Saudi listed banks during 2007-2012 using a sample of 10 listed banks and found that Board size had
159 a positive association with the firm performance but not significant. The result indicated that larger boards were
160 ineffective in enhancing financial performance in the context of Saudi banks.

161 The results of this study also reveal that there is a negative relation between board composition and
162 performance. This result indicates that the second hypothesis is rejected. The second hypothesis is that there is
163 no relationship between Board composition (No. of independent director in the board) and Insurance companies'
164 performance. This negative relationship indicates that when the board composition increases, the performance
165 of the company will decrease and viceversa. The research result is congruent with the study of Ahid Ghabayen
166 (2012) where the researcher investigates the relationship between board composition and performance of non-
167 financial firms in the Saudi market in the year 2011 using a sample of 102 listed non-financial companies and
168 finds a negative relationship between board composition and firm performance.

169 The third hypothesis states that there is no relationship between board meetings and financial performance.
170 Here the research rejects the third hypothesis. The study finds a positive and significant association between
171 board meeting and performance and this result is consistent. The frequency of the board meeting to a large
172 extent will ensure its effectiveness. When the board fails to convene regular meetings to deliberate issues of
173 strategic importance, there will be no independence and accountability to the insurer. Circular resolutions are
174 not perfect substitute for board meetings because they do not offer the opportunity for active debate over the
175 issues circulated. Again, a biased presentation of the reasoning without an avail for the board members can
176 create immediate questions or reservations. This may lead to make inappropriate decisions. The study could not
177 provide a significant relationship between audit committee size and company performance which means that the
178 fourth hypothesis is accepted. This result is in line with the research of Abdur Rouf (2011) who investigated the
179 relationship between the size of AC and performance of the firm (ROA & ROE) in DSE in 2006 using a sample of
180 93 non-financial listed firms and the study revealed that there was no significant relationship between AC size and
181 firm performance. However, the research result provides a view that the corporate governance have an impact
182 on the performance of insurance companies in Bangladesh and the relationship may be positive or negative or
183 no relation, but it has some influence in the commercial terms of the organization. Thus the Summary of the
184 hypothesis results:

185 14 VIII. Conclusion & Recommendations

186 The study finds a correlation and corporate governance have a significant impact on financial performance. The
187 insurance companies should combat to improve its performance along with indicators of corporate governance
188 practices. However, the following recommendation can initiate an effective corporate culture in the insurance
189 sector in Bangladesh. The insurance sector should commence massive awareness campaign through board
190 meetings or other similar communication works like a seminar, workshop and, high lightening the meaning
191 and the business case of good corporate governance. Although the size of the board is in line with best practices,
192 special attention should come from the insurance companies in certain other areas. The board of directors should
193 pay attention to overseeing the risk management and internal function of the insurance company. Awareness on
194 the benefits of having an independent director on the board is of utmost importance and although the study finds
195 a negative relation with ROE, the insurance company should recognize that appointing an independent director
196 can protect the interest of its stakeholders. The insurance company should follow the rule of BSEC. Insurance
197 companies should encourage the audit committee members to understand the role of the committees and should
198 provide proper incentives.

199 15 IX.

200 16 Limitations

201 The study is subject to certain abridgements. First of all, the sample size is small and, that is 10 DSE listed
202 insurance companies. Second, the period of this research is short (I.e., seven years) and the study unable
203 to consider control variables like the capital intensity of the insurance company, leverage, risk, etc. Lastly, the
204 research focuses only on a limited number of corporate governance variables (four variables) and one performance
205 variables, so other variables are not in focus due to unavailability of the data. Therefore it is better for further

Particular	Variables	Description or Measurement	
ROE	Dependent	(Net profit after tax ÷ Shareholders equity) × 100	
BOD	Independent	Total no. of directors in the board	
SIZE			
BOD	Independent	No. of independent directors sitting on the board	
COMP			
BOD	Independent	No. of meetings held	2018
MEET			
AC	Independent	Total member of an audit committee	Year
SIZE			
			35
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			and Business
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Figure 1:

2

Variables	Mini.	Maxi.	Mean	Standard Deviation
BOD SIZE	10	20	16.01	3.02
BOD COMP	1	4	1.93	0.98
BOD MEET	4	16	7.46	2.51
AC SIZE	3	7	4.14	1.265
ROE	0.0106	0.4044	0.1344	0.07035

Figure 2: Table 2 :

16 LIMITATIONS

3

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	ROE	BOD SIZE	BOD COMP	BOD MEET	AC SIZE
ROE					
Pearson correlation	1.00	.174	-.320	.538	-.010
Sig (1-tailed)	.	0.74	0.003	.000	.468
N	70	70	70	70	70
BOD SIZE					
Pearson correlation	0.174	1.000	.171	.060	-.016
Sig (1-tailed)	0.074	.	.078	.310	.449
N	70	70	70	70	70
BOD COMP					
Pearson correlation	-.320	.218	1.000	-.169	.311
Sig (1-tailed)	.003	.078	.	.081	.004
N	70	70	70	70	70
BOD MEET					
Pearson correlation	.538	.060	-.169	1.000	.057
Sig (1-tailed)	.000	.310	.81	.	.320
N	70	70	70	70	70
AC SIZE					
Pearson correlation	-.010	-.016	.311	.057	1.000
Sig (1-tailed)	.468	.449	.004	.320	.
N	70	70	70	70	70

Figure 3: Table 3 :

4

R	R	Adjusted R ²	Std. Er- ²	R ²	df1	df2	Sig. f
.628 .382		.344	.0569882	4	65		.000

Source: Data manipulated by using SPSS

a) predictors: (constant), AC SIZE, BOD SIZE, BOD MEET, BOD COMP

b) Dependent Variable: ROE

The above table shows multiple linear regression which is related to ROE as a dependent variable. The table shows the influence of independent variable (Board of directors, Board composition, Board meeting and Audit committee composition) on the dependent variable (

Figure 4: Table 4 :

5

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t		Tolerance	VIF
(constant)	-.011	.047		-.233	.817		
BOD SIZE	.005	.002	.197	1.972	.053	.956	1.047
BOD	-.021	.008	-.292	-2.730	.008	.833	1.201
COMP							
BOD	.013	.003	.474	4.473	.000	.948	1.054
MEET							
AC SIZE	.003	.006	.057	.553	.582	.884	1.131

Source: Data manipulated by using SPSS

Figure 5: Table 5 :

6

Hypothes	Relationship	Findings
H 1	Between Board Size and ROE	Positive Relationship
H 2	Between Board Comp-osition and ROE	Negative and Significant
H 3	Between Board Meeting and ROE	Positive and Significant
H 4	Between the Size of Audit committee and ROE	No Relationship

Figure 6: Table 6 :

16 LIMITATIONS

206 research to select sample companies from an ample range even from non-financial listed companies, non-listed
207 companies and so on.¹ ²

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208 [The International Journal of Applied Economics and Finance] , *The International Journal of Applied Eco-*
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