

1 The Impact of Ownership Structure on Dividend Policy of Listed
2 Companies in Srilanka: With Special Reference to the Banks
3 Finance and Insurance Sector

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6

7 **Abstract**

8 This paper aims at providing the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the
9 relationship between the ownership structure and dividend policy. For the purpose of this
10 research, sample consists of a panel of 30 Bank Finance and Insurance companies listed in
11 Colombo stock exchange and period of 5 years, from 2011 to 2015. To analyze the impact of
12 the different ownership structure on dividend payout policies of Sri Lankan listed companies, a
13 multiple regression model is performed.

14

15 **Index terms**— institutional ownership, concentrated ownership, foreign ownership, dividend per share,

16 **1 Introduction**

17 One of the most important decisions taken by firms is their dividend policy. In the finance sector the decision on
18 the ownership structure, dividend policy and its components is viewed as one of the most extensively researched
19 area. Dividend distributions tend to reduce the agency problem occurring between managers and shareholders
20 ??Jensen, 1986 and ??ozeff, 1982). According to them, managers tend to prefer dividend retentions in order to
21 use the firms' resources for their own personal benefits. Paying out dividends to shareholders tends to reduce the
22 managerial control over the firms' resources and control their opportunistic behaviors, while avoiding the over
23 investment problems of corporations and wasting the firms' resources on unprofitable projects. Hence, dividend
24 policies can effectively reduce the conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders.

25 The dividend policy of any firm is considered one of the most important decisions made for the corporate
26 policies, as it is considered a reward to shareholders for their contribution in raising funds for a company and
27 for bearing the relevant risks. "Dividend policy is the set of guidelines a company uses to decide how much of
28 its earnings it will pay out to shareholders. Some evidence suggests that investors are not concerned with a
29 company's dividend policy since they can sell a portion of their portfolio of equities if they want cash." Once the
30 company decides on whether to pay dividends they may establish a somewhat permanent dividend policy, which
31 may in turn impact on investors and perceptions of the company in the financial markets. What they decide
32 depends on the situation of the company now and in the future. It also depends on the preferences of investors
33 and potential investors.

34 This paper is designed to test the impact of ownership structure on dividend policies of Sri Lankan firms.
35 According to previous researches conducted on this area, there are many types of ownership structure that affect
36 dividend policies, such as the individual, managerial, institutional, concentrated, and state ownership type of
37 corporate structure, along with few more such as the foreign and family ownership structures. For the purpose of
38 this research, however, only three ownership types of corporate structure are examined throughout this research,
39 to determine their impact on dividend policies of firms in Sri Lanka. These are the institutional ownership, the
40 concentrated ownership, and the foreign ownership.

41 **2 II.**

42 **3 Literature Review**

43 The agency theory focuses on mitigating conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders due to the
44 separation between ownership and control (Jensen and ??eckling, 1976). This paper identifies some of the
45 literature relevant to this research of how the different types of ownership structure affect the dividend policies.
46 It indicates the relationship of this study to the relevant literature. It highlights some of the theories of corporate
47 governance and identifies their relation to different types of ownership of corporate structure, and the importance
48 of finding the possible relationships between ownership structures and dividend policies. Ownership structure is
49 an influential factor on company policies. Decisions regarding to dividend are one of the Fundamental components
50 of corporate policies (Kouki and Guizani, 2009).

51 **4 a) Ownership Concentration and Dividend Policy**

52 Ownership structure is an important internal mechanism of corporate governance. It is defined by the distribution
53 of equity with regard to votes and capital as well as the identity of the equity owners. These structures are of
54 major importance in corporate governance because they determine the incentives of managers and thereby the
55 economic efficiency of the corporations they manage (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Ownership structure consists
56 of individual ownership structure, institution ownership structure and foreign ownership structure.

57 Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal (2004) argued that ownership structure is very important and influential factor in
58 determining the efficiency of the market by giving information about two significant things. First, it shows the
59 extent of risk diversification of shareholders. Second, it gives information about the possible agency problems in
60 the management of the corporation.

61 Ownership structure has an effect on the capital structure and firm performance. ??haganti & Damangpour
62 (1991) found that among the firms in their study, those with a large share of family ownership flavored
63 debt financing while a large share of institutional ownership displayed a positive relationship with return on
64 equityratios. This is supported by Margaritis & Psillaki (2010) who found that a positive relationship between
65 concentration of ownership and higher levels of debt in the capital structure.

66 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer (1999) studied the ownership structure of some of the world's biggest
67 economies in order to find the most appropriate controlling shareholder of the companies included in his sample.
68 Those countries with high shareholder protection have a large amount of shareholders and trading shares through
69 IPO (initial public offering) in the primary market as well as in the OTC market or at least one stock exchange.
70 These types of companies are often controlled by families or the state instead of financial institutions. The
71 controlling shareholder is often involved in pyramids and managerial decisions since the ability to control their
72 surplus of cash flow rights.

73 **5 b) Ownership Identity and Dividend Policy i. Managerial
74 Ownership and Dividend policy**

75 According to Ullah, Fida, and Khan (2012) the managerial ownership is measured by the total proportion of
76 managers, directors, and executives divided by the total capital shares of the firm. Many researchers observed
77 significant relationships between the managerial ownership type of corporate structure and the dividend payout
78 plans.

79 Mehrani, Moradi and Eskandar (2011) found the evidence in support of negative association between the
80 managerial ownership and dividend payment policy. Consequently, we found that many prior studies have found
81 negative association between managerial ownership and dividend payout policy in different circumstances.

82 Jensen ??1986) argued that managers prefer to retain earning instead of giving it to shareholders as a dividend.
83 Managers want to use the resources the growth of the firm as well as for the personal benefits.

84 **6 ii. Institutional Ownership and Dividend Policy**

85 Institutional ownership is defined as the investors with the main characteristic that they are legal entities without
86 any physical persons involved in the process. This includes hedge funds, investment funds and pension funds
87 etc. Another characteristic of institutional investors are that they operate independently or are included in large
88 companies or conglomerates. (Celik & Isaksson,).

89 Many prior studies showed a relationship between the dividend policy and management ownership (Rozeff,
90 1982; Jensen and Meckling 1976) but still there was space to consider the institutional ownership into
91 consideration. Waud (1966), Fama and Babiak (1968) and Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) suggested that
92 there is significant relationship between the dividend policy and institutional ownership.

93 **7 iii. Concentrated Institutional Ownership and Dividend**

94 Policy Kouki and Guizani(2009) argued that Tunisian companies having concentrated ownership distribute more
95 dividends and show positive relationship between the concentrated ownership and dividend payout.

96 Claessens and Djankov (1999) has empirically found in the context of Czech Republic that more concentrated
97 the owners, higher will be the firm profitability and the level of labor productivity. He further argued that
98 concentrated ownership will allow the owners to monitor the managers in a better way by using their powerful
99 seat in the board of director.

100 The greater the concentrated ownership structure, greater will be the need for monitoring. According to
101 Mitton (2005), there exist the positive association between the corporate governance and the dividend Payout in
102 emerging market and it is further argued that the countries having strong investor legal protection are capable
103 to pay more dividend payment.

104 **8 Global Journal of Management and Business Research**

105 Volume XX Issue III Version I Year 2020 () iv. Foreign Share Ownership and Dividend Policy According to
106 Chai (2010), foreign ownership has important impact on the dividend policy of the concerned firm. Baba (2009)
107 observed the influence of foreign investor's ownership on the dividend payout policy of the firms of Japan and
108 the study further showed that higher foreign investor's ownership is related with the higher dividend policy of
109 firm.

110 **9 III.**

111 **10 Empirical Analysis**

112 Despite a great deal of prior research on the subject, few studies investigated the agency and ownership-based
113 explanations of dividend policy. This paper therefore attempts to provide more insights into the literature by
114 providing an empirical analysis on the relationship between corporate payout policy and ownership characteristics.
115 Empirical evidence is a fancy way of describing facts that can be experienced and tested only through the
116 senses. Empirical evidence is evidence from observations. From my understanding it can be through naturalistic
117 observation or experimental. Experimental evidence is much more reliable as naturalistic observations are
118 vulnerable to researcher bias.

119 **11 a) Data Collection**

120 The present study used secondary data for the analysis. Secondary data is the data that have been already
121 collected by and readily available from other sources. Secondary data is often used in social and economic
122 analysis, especially when access to primary data is unavailable. The financial statements which are made up
123 of income statements, balance sheet of the sample listed companies and investors' information were the main
124 sources of data for this study. There were obtained from the annual reports of respective companies. Which
125 were published by CSE in Sri Lanka. Further, scholarly articles from academic journals, relevant text books on
126 the subject and the internet search engines were also used. Specifically, the data of the listed companies in the
127 sample were collected for the period of 2011-2015. This study utilized dividend and different types of ownership
128 structure data. The dividend variables were retrieved from DataStream financial database. In addition, data
129 on ownership was collected from sample companies' annual reports. These annual reports are gathered from
130 the website of CSE. This Paper is analyzed the data description by using the statistical method. All of these
131 following methods are used to investigate the relationship and impact of ownership structure and dividend policy,
132 according this study researcher can use these statistical techniques for interpretation of the data. There are

133 **12 b) Variables' Measure**

134 **13 Analysis and Discussion**

135 **14 a) Descriptive Statistics**

136 Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in a study. In Table 2 descriptive
137 statistics shows a summary of the variables that was taken from the financial statements and the annual reports
138 of sampled firms on the Colombo Stock Exchange. The table reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum,
139 maximum, and the number of observations for each of the dependent and independent variables. In the above
140 table 2 observations have been used for analyzing minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation for each
141 variable. The mean value of institutional ownership ratio, Concentrated ownership ratio, Foreign ownership ratio,
142 Firm Size ratio, Return on equity ratio, Future growth opportunity ratio are 0.677%, 0.698% , 0.193 %, 10.47%,
143 21.69%, and 0.193% respectively with the standard deviations 0.275, 0.210, 0.541, 0.716, 15.38, and 3.478. The
144 descriptive statistics show that over the period under study, the ownership structure measured by DPS & DIVYIE
145 averaged 5.188% and 4.292%, with standard deviations of 7.025 and 3.543 respectively.

146 The above table shows the average number of shares held by institutional shareholders was found to be 0.6771,
147 which implies that almost 67.7144% percent of shares ownership is concentrated in hands home. The standard
148 deviation was however smaller, being 0.275, in this case. In terms of ownership variables, the range of firm
149 concentrated ownership represented by the total of ownership owned by five largest shareholders among 20 major
150 shareholders is from 0.30 to 1.815, the average being 0.698 which implies that almost 69.8percent of shares

17 C) REGRESSION ANALYSIS

151 ownership is concentrated in hands of five largest shareholders in Sri Lankan firms with a standard deviation of
152 0.210. Last independent variable the foreign ownership tends to have an average of 0.193 and to range between
153 a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 3.327, with a standard deviation of 0.541.

154 As per the table, average dividend per share (DPS) is 5.188 ranging from 0 to 45 cash dividend with a standard
155 deviation of 7.025. Having taken decision to pay, almost 5.18% from the earning was paid to the shareholder
156 as a dividend per share. It can be seen that the standard deviation for dividend yield is 3.543 while the average
157 dividend yield distributed among the corporations in the sample is 4.292 per share ranging from 0 to 20.72. The
158 result shows that approximately 90% companies earning retained for further investment in new projects due to
159 enhance the business in future.

160 The average firm size calculated as the log of total assets available in the company under study was found
161 to be 10.47. The table indicates an average of 1.889% of future growth opportunity in Sri Lankan listed banks
162 finance and insurance firms, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 37.90 since it is control variable. The
163 average ROE is found to be 21.69% ranging from -10.25% to a maximum of 93.47%, indicating that majority of
164 the companies in the sample are moderately profitable. This percentage computed the involvement of net income
165 (local currency) which is invested by the firm's shareholders.

166 15 b) Correlation and Multi-co linearity analysis

167 Correlation is concern describing the strength of relationship between two variables. According this study
168 correlation co-efficient analysis is under taken to find out the relationship between Ownership structure and
169 Dividend policy. So indicate what relationship exists among variable. Year 2020 ()F

170 Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficient between Ownership Structure and Dividend policy
171 separately. Value of correlation between institutional ownership ratio and Dividend per share is -0.2498 which is
172 significant associated at the 0.05 level. Therefore, there is a Negative association between institutional ownership
173 ratio and DPS and also the correlation between other concentrated ownership and Dividend per share DPS
174 is -0.1558 which is significant at 0.05 levels. This explains low negative correlation between other concentrated
175 ownership ratio and DPS. Value of correlation between foreign ownership ratio and Dividend per share is 0.4903
176 which is significant associated at the 0.05 level. Therefore, there is a positive association between ratio foreign
177 ownership and DPS.

178 The value of correlation between institutional ownership ratio and Dividend yield is 0.1651 which is significant
179 at 0.05 levels. This represents positive association between institutional ownership ratio and Dividend yield. The
180 value of correlation between other Concentrated ownership and Dividend yield is -0.1791 which significant at 0.05
181 level. This indicates there is negative correlation between concentrated ownership other ratio and DIVYIE.

182 Among the control variables, there is a positive correlation 0.1916 between dividend per share and firm size
183 was surprising. However, negative correlation had been found between dividend per share and future growth
184 opportunity -0.115 and ROE -0.010. The results also revealed that firm size has positive correlation 0.0872 with
185 dividend yield. And negative correlation was observed between dividend yield and Future growth opportunities
186 -0.0797. There is positive correlation 0.2709 found between one of the control variable ROE and dividend yield.

187 16 i. Multi-Co linearity

188 Variance inflation factors (VIF) measure how much the variance of the estimated regression coefficients are
189 inflated as compared to when the predictor variables are not linearly related.

190 Use to describe how much multi-co linearity (correlation between predictors) exists in a regression analysis.
191 Multi-co linearity is problematic because it can increase the variance of the regression coefficients, making them
192 unstable and difficult to interpret.

193 Use the following guidelines to interpret the VIF: VIF = 1 -Not correlated 1 < VIF < 5 -Moderately correlated
194 VIF > 5 to 10 -Highly correlated Multi-Co linearity: Two major methods were used in order to determine the
195 presence of multi-co linearity among independent variables in this study. These methodologies involved calculation
196 of a Tolerance test and variance inflation factor (VIF) (Ahsan, ??bdullah, Gunfie, & Alam,2009).

197 The results of these analysis are presented in table 4.10 Test of Co linearity.

198 17 c) Regression analysis

199 The strengths of the influence that the indicator of independent variable has on each of the dependent variable
200 are determined by the use of single regression coefficients of the predictor variables In this research According to
201 the table 4.6. Test of Co linearity, none of the tolerance level is < or equal to 1; and also VIF values are perfectly
202 below 10. Thus the measures selected for assessing independent variable in this study reach levels indicate of
203 multi-co linearity. It shows the Mean Vale 1.22.

204 . the regression analysis has been carried out to find out the pattern of variation of the dependent variable
205 (Dividend per share and Dividend yield) in relation to the values of independent variable (Institutional ownership,
206 concentrated ownership, and foreign share ownership). F

207 The Column of unstandardized coefficients' gives coefficient value for the regression model. The constant
208 of 9.778 is intercept, (-3.757) institutional ownership ratio, (-4.600) other concentrated ownership ratio, 6.010
209 foreign ownership ratio are slope, and X is independent variables and Y is the DPS. The slope of the Coefficient

210 provides with the most important The table shows the R value is 31.53 % this is the correlation between the
211 dependent variable and independent variable (predicted variable). Here, Institutional ownership, concentrated
212 ownership, Foreign share ownership are independent variable and DPS is dependent variable. According to the
213 table, correlation is 31.53% that means there is a positive direction of relationship between Ownership structure
214 and DPS.R square is the square of R and is also known as the coefficient of determination. The table shows the
215 R 2 value is 0.3153 and which is computed to identify the impact of Ownership structure (institutional ownership
216 ratio, concentrated ownership ratio, foreign share ownership ratio) on DPS. From the above table it is crystal
217 clear that Ownership structure (institutional ownership ratio, concentrated ownership ratio and other foreign
218 share ownership) are contributed to determine DPS by 31.5 3%. The remaining 68.5% is influenced by factors
219 other than Ownership structure (institutional ownership ratio, concentrated ownership ratio and foreign share
220 ownership ratio). The Adjusted R Square refers to the best estimate of R square is for the population from which
221 sample was drawn. According to the table adjusted R square is 0.2866. information, it shows by how much the
222 Dependent scores changes for a change in the independent score by one unit. When firm ownership structures no
223 effect on DPS, in the DPS value is 9.778. If the institutional ownership ratio is increased by one unit then DPS
224 value will increase by -3.757, likewise the other concentrated ownership ratio has negative b -4.600 value. This
225 reveals that other institutional ownership ratio, concentrated ownership ratio DPS tends to move in opposite
226 direction. But the foreign ownership ratio and DPS tends to move in positive direction.

227 According to the table it is seen that there is a significant impact of institutional ownership ratio on DPS, here
228 significant value is -5.096.and also there is a significant impact of concentrated ownership ratio on DPS, there is
229 a significant impact of ratio foreign ownership ratio on DPS.

230 **18 Model 2 Impact of ownership structure on Dividend yield**

231 Based on findings in the first step of hierarchical multiple regression, six predictors were entered: FGO, ROE,
232 FSIZE, FOROWN, INSOOWN and CONOWN. This model was statistically significant with $F = 4.57$; and (r^2) of
233 the total variance in dividend yield which determines the effectiveness and importance of the independent variables
234 on the model. Since the Adjusted R-Square (0.1608) is close to the R-Square (0.1255), then the independent
235 variables are proved to be effective and important in relation to the dependent variables. The Column of
236 unstandardized coefficients' gives coefficient value for the regression model. The constant of 5.234 is intercept,
237 2.256 institutional ownership ratio, (-3.391) other concentrated ownership ratio, (-0.541) foreign ownership ratio
238 are slope, and X is independent variables and Y is the Dividend yield. The slope of the Coefficient provides
239 with the most important information; it shows by how much the Dependent scores changes for a change in the
240 independent score by one unit. When firm ownership structures no effect on DIVYIE, in the DIVYIE value is
241 5.234. If the institutional ownership ratio is increased by one unit then DIVYIE value will increase by 2.256,
242 likewise the other concentrated ownership ratio has negative b -3.391 value. This reveals that other concentrated
243 ownership ratio and foreign ownership ratio DIVYIE tends to move in opposite direction. But the Institutional
244 ownership and DIVYIE tends to move in positive direction.

245 V.

246 **19 Conclusion**

247 This study was designed to observe the impact of ownership structure on the corporate dividend policies by
248 examining the sample of 30 bank, finance and insurance firms listed in Colombo stock exchange for the period
249 2011 to 2015. This study has been examined through descriptive statistics such as mean, minimum and maximum
250 value and standard deviation. Rather than correlation and regression analysis also used to find out the impact
251 between dependent and independent variable by using STATA statistical package.

252 On the basis of correlation and regression analysis institutional ownership and DPS have significantly negative
253 impact, DPS shows an insignificant negative relation with concentrated ownership. Foreign ownership has
254 significantly strong positive relation with DPS therefore the companies should care more on foreign owners
255 of the shares because they provide more benefits to these firms. The ROE relates positively and statistically
256 insignificant with the DPS. The firm size in the regression model revealed a positive affiliation with DPS variable,
257 but it is statistically insignificant and the future growth opportunity shows the negative relationship with DPS.

258 At the same time significantly positive relationship has been found between institutional ownership and
259 dividend yield. While significantly negative relationship has been found between concentrated ownership and
260 dividend yield. And foreign ownership has an insignificant negative relationship with DIVYIE.

261 The return on equity relates positively and statistically significant with the dividend yield. The firm size in
262 the regression model revealed a negative affiliation with dividend yield variable, but it is statistically insignificant
263 and here once again the future growth opportunity shows the negative relationship with dividend yield. ¹

19 CONCLUSION

1

Concept	Variable	Indicator	Measurement	Year
	Institutional ownership	INSTOWN	shares held by non financial institutions	(2020)
	Concentrated	T.capital shares)
Ownership structure	Institutional Ownership	CONOWN	T.shares held by top 5 shareholders among Major 20 shareholders	
	Foreign Ownership	FSOWNT	T.capital shares	
	Dividend per share	DPS	Total dividend No of ordinary shares	
Dividend policy	dividend yield	DIVYIE	DPS / Market price per share*100	
	Firm Size	SIZE	Natural log of total assets	
Control variable	Future growth opportunities	FGO	Share Price Beginning of the year /Net Asset Value per Share	
	Return on Equity (ROE)	ROE	Net income / Total equity*100	

[Note: F c) Methodology The broader objective of this research is to study the impact of ownership structure on dividend policy of Bank Finance and Insurance companies. According to Creswell (2009), the variables need to be specified in quantitative researches so that it is clear to readers what groups are receiving the experimental treatment and what outcomes are being measured.]

Figure 1: Table 1 :

2

Variables	Number	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
DPS	150	5.188	7.025	0	45
DIVYIE	150	4.292	3.543	0	20.72
INSOWN	150	0.677	0.275	0	0.983
CONOWN	150	0.698	.0.210	.0.300	1.815
FOROWN	150	0.193	0.541	0	3.327
SIZE	150	10.47	0.716	8.688	11.90
FGO	150	1.889	3.478	0	37.90
ROE	150	21.69	15.38	-10.25	93.47

Figure 2: Table 2 :

3

	DPS	DIVYIE	INSOWN	CONOWN	FOROWN	SIZE	FGO	ROE
DPS	1							
DIVYIE	0.0082	1						
	0.9205							
INSOWN	-0.2498*	0.1651*	1					
	0.0021	0.0435						
CONOWN	0.1558	-0.1791*	0.125	1				
	0.057	0.0283	0.1274					
FOROWN	0.4903*	-0.115	-0.1851*	0.0001	1			
	0	0.1612	0.0233	0.9991				
SIZE	0.1916*	0.0872	0.2318*	-0.4771*	0.0898	1		
	0.0188	0.2884	0.0043	0	0.2746			
FGO	-0.1152	-0.0797	0.092	0.0069	-0.0673	-0.0672	1	
	0.1603	0.3324	0.2628	0.9335	0.4131	0.4137		
ROE	-0.0103	0.2709*	0.0337	0.0816	-0.1404	-0.0895	-0.0059	1
	0.9001	0.0008	0.6821	0.3209	0.0865	0.2762	0.9433	

Figure 3: Table 3 :

4

Year 2020	VARIABLE	1: Test of Co linearity	
16	VIF	1/VIF	
Volume XX Issue III	INSOWN	1.05 1.04 1.02 1.04 Table 4.2: Test of Co lin-	0.95009 0.96518
Version I	FOROWN	earity	0.983806
	CONOWN Mean	VIF	
)	VARIABLE	VIF	1/VIF
(F	SIZE CONOWN	1.52 1.43 1.23 1.09 1.03	0.655879
Global Journal of Management and Business	INSOWN	1.02 1.22	0.700653
Research	FOROWN ROE		0.815169
	FGO Mean VIF		0.918041
			0.971116
			0.978007

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Figure 4: Table 4 .

5

VARIABLES	2: Coefficients	
	(1)	(2)
INSOWN	Model 1 -3.757 (2.693)	Model 2 2.256** (0.886)
CONOWN	-4.600*** (1.348)	-3.391*** (0.914)
FOROWN	6.010*** (1.186)	-0.541*** (0.177)
Constant	9.778*** (2.710)	5.234*** (0.903)
Observations	150	150
R-squared	0.285	0.074

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

DPS= ?0+?1 INSOWN +?2 CONOWN + ?3FOROWN+e=-3.856-4.705INSOWN-2.730CONOWN+5.988FO

Figure 5: Table 5 .

5

1: Model Summary		
R	R Square	Adjusted R Square
31.53%	0.3153	0.2866

Figure 6: Table 5 .

53

R	: Model Summary		
	R Square	Adjusted R Square	R
16.08%	0.1608	0.1255	
The table shows the correlation between the dependent variable and independent variable (predicted variable). Here, Institutional ownership, concentrated			
18 ownership, Table 5.4: Coefficients			
VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	
INSOWN	Model 1 -3.757 (2.693)	Model 2 2.256** (0.886)	
CONOWN	-4.600*** (1.348)	-3.391*** (0.914)	

Figure 7: Table 5 . 3

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